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The paper studies the short-run, transitional, and long-run output effects of permanent and 
temporary shocks in public consumption under various financing methods. To this end, a 
dynamic macroeconomic model for a closed economy is developed, which features a perfectly 
competitive final goods sector and a monopolistically competitive intermediate goods sector. 
Finitely lived households consume final goods, supply labor, and save part of their income. 
Amongst the findings for a permanent rise in public consumption are: (i) monopolistic 
competition increases the absolute value of the balanced-budget output multiplier; (ii) positive 
long-run output multipliers are obtained only if the generational turnover effect is dominated 
by the intertemporal labor supply effect; (iii) short-run out- put multipliers under lump-sum 
tax financing are smaller than long-run output multipliers if labor supply is elastic; and (iv) 
bond financing reduces the size of long-run output multipliers as compared to lump-sum tax 
financing and may give rise to non-monotonic adjustment paths if labor supply is sufficiently 
elastic and the speed of adjustment of lump-sum taxes is not too high. Temporary bond-
financed fiscal shocks are shown to yield: (i) permanent effects on output; and (ii) negative 
long-run output multipliers. 
JEL Code: E12, E63, L16. 
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the project. 1 Introduction
The recent economic downturns in Europe and the United States have revived the long-
standing debate on the role ﬁscal policy can play in stimulating economic activity. The
widely held belief among both academics and policy makers—ﬁrmly rooted in the traditional
Keynesian view—is that public spending multipliers exceed unity. Empirical studies yield
short-run public spending multipliers typically ranging from 0.6 to 1.4, whereas long-run
multipliers are generally smaller, reﬂecting crowding out eﬀects.1 The simple Keynesian view
assumes perfect competition on goods and labor markets, exogenously imposed price rigidity,
and excess capacity, so that output is demand determined. In the last decade, however, a
number of authors have stressed that output and employment multipliers in an imperfectly
competitive environment are likely to exceed those under perfect competition.2 These studies
typically employ static models of monopolistic competition in the New Keynesian tradition,
featuring explicit price setting and clearing labor and goods markets.
The main objective of this paper is to study theoretically the dynamic macroeconomic
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. To this end, we develop a dynamic (non-stochastic) monopolistically
competitive model, featuring overlapping generations (OLG) in the tradition of Yaari (1965)
and Blanchard (1985)—in which households face a constant probability of death—and endoge-
nous intertemporal labor supply. Our framework builds on the twin pillars of the Keynesian
view—monopolistic competition and the failure of Ricardian equivalence. We employ an ex-
tended Yaari-Blanchard model to investigate in what way productivity eﬀects associated with
monopolistic competition and wealth eﬀects related to ﬁnitely lived agents aﬀect the size and
the sign of balanced-budget output multipliers.3 In keeping with the recent literature, we
reserve a central role for exit and entry of ﬁrms, which makes it possible to relate our ﬁndings
to those found of models based on inﬁnitely lived households. We consider various modes of
ﬁnancing (lump-sum taxes and government bonds) of two types of shocks (permanent and
temporary) to public consumption. The analysis of temporary ﬁscal shocks allows us to link
our results with those found in Vector Autoregressive (VAR) studies.4
Studies analyzing the long-run output eﬀects of ﬁscal policy generally develop dynamic
general equilibrium models with New Keynesian features. Most authors work in the RBC
1Based on a review of simulations with calibrated large-scale macroeconomic models. See Hemming, Kell,
and Mahfouz (2002).
2See, for example, Startz (1989), Molana and Moutos (1992), and Heijdra and van der Ploeg (1996). The
latter have shown that free entry of ﬁrms may have important productivity enhancing eﬀects.
3Simple Keynesian multipliers measure the eﬀect on output of an exogenous increase in public spending not
taking into account its ﬁnancing, implying a deterioration of the ﬁscal balance. Unlike the simple Keynesian
view, our ﬁscal multipliers are ‘balanced budget’ under lump-sum taxation and explicitly take into account
the intertemporal government budget constraint under bond ﬁnancing.
4Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), Fat´ as and Mihov (2001), and Mountford and Uhlig (2002),
employ VAR models to study the dynamic eﬀects of ﬁscal policy and to compare the results with those of
calibrated general equilibrium models.
1tradition by allowing for stochastic shocks, a notable exception is the deterministic framework
of Heijdra (1998). The literature is still relatively small. Early work by Devereux, Head, and
Lapham (1996b) and Heijdra (1998)—who assume inﬁnitely lived households—abstracts from
nominal rigidities, whereas more recent contributions, including Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es
(2004), Linnemann and Schabert (2003), Linnemann (2004), and Coenen and Straub (2004)
model some form of price or wage stickiness.5
The reason we focus on monopolistic competition is that it is the key pillar of New Key-
nesian economics. A number of authors working in the real business cycle (RBC) tradition6
have shown—employing dynamic stochastic macroeconomic models—that monopolistic com-
petition plays a vital role in explaining output persistence. Numerical results by Chatterjee
and Cooper (1993) indicate that a model with free entry and exit of ﬁrms exhibits a slower
adjustment speed—and thus more output persistence—than a perfectly competitive model or
an increasing-returns-to-scale model with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms. Since the lack of a quanti-
tatively signiﬁcant propagation mechanism is widely considered to be an important weakness
of RBC models (Stadler, 1994, p. 1769), monopolistic competition may therefore have a
useful role to play in the analysis of ﬁscal spending shocks, not only in RBC frameworks but
also in non-stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models more generally.
We extend the Yaari-Blanchard framework to incorporate endogenous (intertemporal)
labor supply, which allows us to: (i) generate meaningful short-run output eﬀects in a model
that features a predetermined capital stock; and (ii) model a shock propagation mechanism,
which is crucial to the multiplier mechanism of ﬁscal spending. The early studies show that
an unanticipated and permanent increase in government consumption ﬁnanced in a lump-
sum fashion gives rise to a negative wealth eﬀect that increases labor supply. The saving-
investment accelerator propagates the shock and thus helps to explain a positive eﬀect on
output and employment. The productivity eﬀects associated with the free entry and exit of
ﬁrms magniﬁes this labor supply eﬀect so that even relatively small economies of scale can
make a major diﬀerence to the size of the long-run output eﬀect of government spending.
In contrast, under exogenous labor supply and inﬁnitely lived households, long-run output
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy are zero, reﬂecting full crowding out of private by public consumption.
The novelty of our approach is the introduction of a population of ﬁnitely lived households
in a modiﬁed representation of Heijdra’s (1998) framework.7 The Blanchard-Yaari framework
has also been used in RBC models of a small open economy to obtain a unique and stationary
5We do not model price adjustment costs, given that our model does not include a monetary sector. Because
of the absence of price stickiness, our work is most closely related to Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996b)
and Heijdra (1998). Coto-Mart´ ınez (2006) also follows this tradition, but his work focuses on public capital
instead of public consumption.
6See the work of Chatterjee and Cooper (1993), Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1993, 1996a-b), B´ enassy
(1996b), Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), and Woodford (2001).
7Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) also employ the Yaari-Blanchard framework, which they use to study the
interactions between monetary and ﬁscal policy rules.
2steady state. See Cardia (1991) and, more recently, Cavallo and Ghironi (2002).8 We consider
a closed economy, in which the rate of interest is endogenous, implying that ﬁnite lives are
not needed as a stationarity inducing device. More importantly, the ﬁnite lives extension is
of interest because it has substantive implications of its own. Ricardian equivalence breaks
down, so that bond ﬁnancing has now a meaningful role in generating results that diﬀer from
those under lump-sum taxes. A number of new results emerge.
Under bond ﬁnancing of a permanent ﬁscal impulse the size of long-run output multi-
pliers is signiﬁcantly reduced as compared to lump-sum tax ﬁnancing. Bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal
shocks may give rise to non-monotonic transition paths, irrespective of the type of shock, if
labor supply is suﬃciently elastic and the adjustment speed of lump-sum taxes is not too
high. Temporary shocks are shown to have permanent eﬀects, whereas in an inﬁnite horizon
framework the economy is left unaﬀected in the long run. Generally, we ﬁnd a negative corre-
lation between private consumption and output in the short run. However, a temporary rise
in public consumption combined with an initial cut in lump-sum taxes, generates a positive
correlation between private consumption and output in the medium and long run, providing
a partial underpinning of the evidence found in VAR studies.
Under lump-sum tax ﬁnancing of a permanent ﬁscal impulse, ﬁnite lives lowers the size
of output multipliers, and possibly even changes their sign as compared to inﬁnite horizons.
Such a sign change occurs if private consumption and investment are crowded out in the long
run, owing to a generational-turnover eﬀect that dominates the conventional labor supply
eﬀect. If labor supply is exogenous, a negative long-run output eﬀect is sure to materialize
against a zero value obtained for the inﬁnite horizon model. Numerical evidence, however,
suggests that the generational-turnover eﬀect is relatively weak for plausible parameter values,
and as such is unlikely to overturn results derived under an inﬁnite lives assumption.
Another contribution of our paper is that we are able to characterize analytically the
short-run, transitional, and long-run eﬀects of permanent and temporary ﬁscal shocks. In
contrast, Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996b) and many other RBC studies only obtain
analytical results for the long-run eﬀects, and have to resort to numerical simulations to
compute the impact and transitional eﬀects. We log-linearize the model and then solve it
by making use of the Laplace transform technique pioneered by Judd (1982, 1998). We are
able to trace out theoretical impulse responses of public spending shocks at business cycle
frequencies. The impulse response functions can be shown to depend in a simple way on
the structural parameters of the model. For permanent ﬁscal shocks, we have developed a
simple diagrammatic apparatus to present the adjustment paths after a policy change and to
8For the existence of a stationary equilibrium in the representative agent framework, the (ﬁxed) pure rate
of time preference must be equal to the real rate of interest, which is exogenous in a small open economy (i.e.,
determined on world capital markets). With ﬁnite lives the world rate of interest need not be equal to the
pure rate of time preference (see Blanchard, 1985, pp 230-231). See also Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2003) for
an overview of alternative ways to induce stationarity.
3demonstrate the pivotal role of the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the basic dynamic OLG model,
featuring a perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods sector and a monopolistically competitive in-
termediate goods sector. Section 3 solves the model both analytically and graphically and
analyzes the dynamic properties of the model. Section 4 studies analytically the output eﬀects
of a permanent rise in government consumption ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes. In addition,
it presents some numerical exercises to demonstrate the quantitative workings of the model.
Section 5 analyzes how the results under lump-sum taxation are aﬀected by bond ﬁnancing
of permanent ﬁscal shocks. It also studies numerically the eﬀects of temporary ﬁscal shocks.
Finally, Section 6 concludes and provides directions for further research.
2 A Two-Sector Model
2.1 Firms
The economy consists of two types of ﬁrms. There are monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each
of which produces a slightly unique variety of an intermediate input, and perfectly competitive
ﬁrms, which produce ﬁnal output using intermediate goods. This way of modeling the ﬁrm
sector is a modiﬁed representation of Hornstein (1993).
2.1.1 Final Goods Sector
Technology in the ﬁnal goods sector is described by a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregator function:





, η ≥ 1, µ > 1, (1)
where Y (t) denotes aggregate output of ﬁnal goods, Zi(t) is the quantity of variety i of the
diﬀerentiated intermediate good, N(t) is the number of input varieties, and t denotes time.
The parameter η regulates the productivity eﬀect of increased input variety, and µ/(µ−1) is
the constant elasticity of substitution between any pair of input varieties.9 The production
function of the ﬁnal goods sector (1) implies external economies of scale, owing to increasing
diversity, provided η > 1. This is the basic Ethier (1982) eﬀect: more diversity in the
diﬀerentiated goods sector enables ﬁnal goods producers to use a more roundabout production
process, which lowers unit cost.10
9Our production function (1) is more general than the one used by Hornstein (1993) and Devereux, Head,
and Lapham (1996b) in that the diversity eﬀect (η) and the price elasticity of input demand (µ/(1 − µ)) are
parameterized separately. Ethier (1982), Heijdra and Van der Ploeg (1996), Devereux, Head, and Lapham
(1996a), B´ enassy (1996a-b), and Dixit and Stiglitz ([1975], 2004) also explicitly distinguish the two conceptually
diﬀerent eﬀects.
10Note that these external scale economies only become eﬀective if the number of ﬁrms is allowed to change.
Holding constant N (t), the technology (1) features constant returns to scale in the Zi (t) inputs.
4The representative producer in the ﬁnal goods sector minimizes the cost of producing a
given quantity of ﬁnal goods, p(t)Y (t), by choosing the optimal mix of diﬀerent input varieties,
where p(t) is unit cost:






and pi(t) is the price of input variety i. The input demand functions are obtained by applying
Shephard’s lemma to (2):






and feature a constant elasticity of demand. Output of the ﬁnal goods sector is either con-
sumed (by households or the government) or invested to augment the aggregate capital stock.
2.1.2 Intermediate Goods Sector
The intermediate goods sector consists of N(t) monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each of
which produces a single diﬀerentiated input. The typical ﬁrm i rents capital, Ki(t), and labor,
Li(t), from the household sector. The gross production function of a ﬁrm, F(.) is given by:
Zi(t) + Φ = F(Li(t),Ki(t)) ≡ Li(t)εLKi(t)1−εL, 0 < εL < 1, (4)
where Zi(t) is net marketable production of input variety i, Φ are ﬁxed costs modeled in









p(t)(Zi(t) + Φ), (5)
where w(t) is the real wage rate, r(t) is the real rate of interest, and δ is the rate of depreciation
of capital. Each ﬁrm in the intermediate goods sector faces a downward-sloping demand curve
for its own input variety from producers in the ﬁnal goods sector (see (3)). Firms maximize
proﬁts—by choosing their price and factor demands—subject to (3) and (5). As a result, the















where ρi(t) ≡ (Zi(t) + Φ)/Zi(t) > 1 measures (local) internal increasing returns to scale due
to the existence of ﬁxed costs. Furthermore, the factor demands by ﬁrm i are determined by






= µ(r(t) + δ). (7)
5Under Chamberlinian monopolistic competition exit and entry of ﬁrms occurs instantaneously,






By combining (6) and (8), we obtain µ = ρi(t), which implies an equilibrium ﬁrm size in the
intermediate goods sector of:






In keeping with Blanchard (1985), there is a ﬁxed population of agents each facing a constant
probability of death (β ≥ 0). Generations are disconnected because there are no bequests.
During their entire life agents have a time endowment of unity, which they allocate to labor





[εC logC(v,z) + (1 − εC)log[1 − L(v,z)]]e(α+β)(t−z)dz, (10)
where C(v,t) and L(v,t) denote private consumption and labor supply in period t by an
agent born in period v, respectively, α is the pure rate of time preference (α > 0), and εC is
a preference parameter (0 < εC < 1). The agent’s budget identity is:
˙ A(v,t) = [r(t) + β]A(v,t) + w(t)L(v,t) − T(t) − C(v,t), (11)
where ˙ A(v,t) ≡ dA(v,t)/dt, A(v,t) are real ﬁnancial assets, r(t) is the real rate of interest,
w(t) is the real wage rate (assumed to be age independent), and T(t) are real net lump-sum
taxes. The ﬁnal good is used as the numeraire (p(t) = 1).
The representative agent, endowed with perfect foresight, chooses a time proﬁle for C(v,t)
and L(v,t) in order to maximize Λ(v,t) subject to its budget identity (11) and a no-Ponzi-
game (NPG) solvency condition. The household’s optimal time proﬁle of consumption is:
˙ C(v,t)
C(v,t)
= r(t) − α, (12)
and labor supply is linked to private consumption and the wage rate according to (T1.7) in
Table 1. Since the aggregate stock of ﬁnancial assets is positive (A(t) > 0), the steady-state
rate of interest must exceed the pure rate of time preference, that is, r > α.11
11The rising individual consumption proﬁles (see (12)) ensure that ﬁnancial wealth is transferred—via life-
insurance companies—from deceased to surviving generations in the steady state.
6Table 1: Main Model Equations
˙ K(t) = I(t) − δK(t) (T1.1)
˙ C(t) = [r(t) − α]C(t) − βεC(α + β)[K(t) + B(t)] (T1.2)
˙ B(t) = r(t)B(t) + G(t) − T(t) (T1.3)
w(t)L(t) = εLY (t) (T1.4)
[r(t) + δ]K(t) = (1 − εL)Y (t) (T1.5)
Y (t) = C(t) + I(t) + G(t) (T1.6)









N(t)η = Ω0L(t)ηεLK(t)η(1−εL) (T1.8)
Ω
1/η









Note: Ω0 ≡ µ−η [(µ − 1)/Φ]
(η−1)
2.2.2 Aggregate Household Sector
A key feature of Blanchard’s (1985) model is its simple demographic structure, which enables
the analytical aggregation over all currently alive households. At each instant of time a
large cohort of size βF is born and βF agents die. Normalizing F to unity, the size of
the population is constant and equal to unity. Aggregate variables can be calculated as the
weighted sum of the values for the diﬀerent generations. Aggregate ﬁnancial wealth is, for
example, A(t) ≡
R t
−∞ A(v,t)βeβ(v−t)dv. Similarly, the aggregate values for C(t), L(t), and
T(t) can be derived.
The main equations describing the behavior of the aggregate household sector are given
by (T1.2) and (T1.7) in Table 1. Equation (T1.2) is the aggregate Euler equation modiﬁed for
the existence of ﬁnitely lived agents. It has the same form as the Euler equation for individual
households (equation (12)), except for a correction term, which represents the distributional
eﬀects caused by the turnover of generations. Optimal individual consumption growth is the
same for all generations since they face the same rate of interest. But old generations have
a higher private consumption level than young generations because they are wealthier. Since
existing generations are continually being replaced by newborns, who possess no ﬁnancial
wealth, aggregate consumption growth falls short of individual consumption growth.
72.3 Government
The government’s periodic budget identity is given in (T1.3), where B(t) is real government
debt at time t. The government consumes G(t) units of the ﬁnal good. Government spending
consists of goods consumption and debt service, which is ﬁnanced by issuing debt, ˙ B(t), or
by changing the lump-sum tax, T(t). Since the government must remain solvent, the NPG
condition is limz→∞ B(z)exp[−
R z
t r(s)ds] = 0, so that (T1.3) can be integrated forward to












Solvency of the government implies that the present value of current and future primary
surpluses must be equal to the pre-existing level of government debt.
2.4 Symmetric Equilibrium
The model is symmetric and can thus be expressed in aggregate terms. Equation (9) shows
that all existing ﬁrms in the intermediate sector are of equal size, ¯ Z, and hence (by (6))
charge the same price and (by (7)) demand the same amounts of capital and labor, that is,
Ki(t) = ¯ K(t) and Li(t) = ¯ L(t). Equation (1) yields the expression for aggregate output in
the ﬁnal goods sector, that is, Y (t) = N(t)η ¯ Z. Hence, aggregate output of ﬁnal goods is an
iso-elastic function of the number of input varieties, N(t).
The main equations of the model are reported in Table 1. Equations (T1.1)-(T1.3) describe
the dynamics of the model. The aggregate physical capital stock evolves according to (T1.1),
which shows that net investment equals gross investment minus replacement of the worn-out
capital stock. The movement of consumption is described by equation (T1.2), which is the
aggregate Euler equation corrected for the turnover of generations. We have used the fact
that ﬁnancial wealth is the sum of equity shares12 and government bonds. The government
budget identity is given in (T1.3).
Aggregate demand for labor and capital is given by (T1.4) and (T1.5), respectively. The
equilibrium condition for the ﬁnal goods market is presented in (T1.6), and aggregate labor
supply is given in (T1.7). The equilibrium number of ﬁrms and the aggregate production
function for the ﬁnal goods sector are both given in (T1.8). Given the equilibrium number
product varieties, there are constant returns to scale with respect to the production factors,
but increasing returns to scale for aggregate output.13
Finally, (T1.4) and (T1.5) can be substituted in (T1.8) to obtain the factor price frontier
(T1.9). On the left-hand side of this expression are the factors leading to an outward shift
12The market value of claims on the capital stock (that is, shares) is equal to the replacement value of the
capital stock, owing to free entry and exit of ﬁrms. As a result, K(t) measures both the physical capital stock
and the real value of shares.
13Foreshadowing the discussion on short-run output multipliers somewhat, equation (T1.8) shows clearly
that, as capital is predetermined, output eﬀects occur at impact only if there is a labor supply response.
8of the factor price frontier, namely traditional productivity gains (a rise in Ω0) and Ethier
productivity eﬀects (a rise in Y (t) if η > 1).
3 Model Solution
3.1 Stability
The local stability of the model can be studied by log-linearizing it around an initial steady
state in which there is no government debt (B(0) = 0). Appendix Table 1 presents the main
expressions. The state variables are the aggregate physical capital stock (a predetermined
variable) and private consumption (a jump variable). By using labor demand (AT1.4), labor
supply (AT1.7), and the aggregate production function (AT1.8)—all taken from Appendix
Table 1—a ‘quasi-reduced form’ for aggregate output, ˜ Y (t), is obtained:
˜ Y (t) = ηφ(1 − εL) ˜ K(t) − (φ − 1) ˜ C(t), (14)
where a tilde denotes a relative change, for example, ˜ Y (t) ≡ dY (t)/Y , and φ represents the
intertemporal labor supply eﬀect as given in Deﬁnition 1.




1 + θ(1 − ηεL)
≥ 1, (15)
where θ ≡ (1−L)/L ≥ 0 is the ratio of leisure to labor (which is the intertemporal substitution
elasticity of aggregate labor supply). Note that φ = 1 if labor supply is exogenous.14 Two cases
concerning η can be distinguished:
(i) If ηεL ≤ 1, the sign restriction on φ is automatically implied since θ ≥ 0. If ηεL < 1,
φ is a concave function of θ with a positive asymptote of (1 − ηεL)−1 as θ → ∞. If
ηεL = 1, then φ = 1 + θ ≥ 1; and
(ii) If ηεL > 1, φ has a vertical asymptote at θ = (ηεL −1)−1, and for 0 < θ < (ηεL −1)−1,
φ is a convex and increasing function of θ exceeding unity.
In order to cover the case of ηεL > 1, we make the following assumption regarding the range
of admissible values for θ.
Assumption 1 If ηεL > 1, it is assumed that 0 ≤ θ < ¯ φ ≡ 1/(ηεL − 1).
14Under exogenous labor supply, L = 1, which implies that θ = 0. From (15) it follows that φ = 1.
9By using (14), (AT1.5), and (AT1.6) in (AT1.1)-(AT1.2), the dynamic system can be
written as:














The Jacobian matrix (with typical element δij) is deﬁned as:
∆ ≡
"
y [ηφ(1 − εL) − ωI] −y(ωC + φ − 1)
−(r − α) − (r + δ)[1 − ηφ(1 − εL)] (r − α) − (r + δ)(φ − 1)
#
, (17)
where ωC and ωI denote the output shares of private consumption and investment, respec-
tively, and γK(t) and γC(t) are shock terms (see (20) below). Saddle-point stability holds
provided the determinant of ∆ is negative (Proposition 1).
Proposition 1 (i) Under ﬁnite horizons χ ≡ 1 − η(1 − εL) > ωG/φ is a suﬃcient condition
for saddle-point stability, whereas under inﬁnite horizons χ > 0 is suﬃcient; (ii) The char-
acteristic roots of the stable case are r∗ > r − α + ωC(r + δ) > 0 and −h∗ < 0; and (iii) The
accelerator for time-invariant shocks takes the form ˜ I(0) = (h∗/δ) ˜ K(∞).
Proof See Appendix A.3.
The intuition behind the suﬃcient condition χ > 0 is that there should be diminishing
returns to the aggregate capital stock (see (T1.8)). If households have inﬁnite lives, labor
supply is elastic and government spending is positive, the negative wealth eﬀect in labor
supply of a rise in the capital stock ensures that the marginal product of capital falls even if
χ = 0. As households get wealthier, they consume more leisure, which reduces the marginal
productivity of capital. With both ﬁnite horizons and elastic labor supply, the suﬃcient
condition depends on the values of the parameters. To simplify the discussion we impose:
Assumption 2 χ ≡ 1 − η(1 − εL) > ωG/φ,
which is very mild for plausible parameter values. Based on the parameter values of Section
4.3, we obtain χ = 0.61, which easily satisﬁes the suﬃcient condition for exogenous labor
supply (φ = 1), and a fortiori for endogenous labor supply (φ > 1).
3.2 Fiscal Policy Shocks
The rise in public spending can be permanent or temporary. In formal terms:
˜ G(t) = ˜ Ge−ξGt, ξG ≥ 0, (18)
10where ξG is the adjustment speed of public consumption, and ˜ G > 0. A permanent spending
increase implies ξG = 0 so that ˜ G(0) = ˜ G(∞) = ˜ G. For 0 < ξG ≪ ∞, the spending shock is
temporary so that we get:
˜ G(∞) ≡
(
˜ G for ξG = 0
0 for 0 < ξG ≪ ∞.
(19)








((r − α)/ωA) ˜ B(t)
#
, (20)
which can be potentially time varying depending on the parameter setting. Temporary spend-
ing shocks give rise to a time varying γK(t). Bond ﬁnancing causes γC(t) to be time-varying
provided r  = α, that is, if Ricardian equivalence fails.
Proposition 2 summarizes some properties of the model that are useful in discussing the
policy shocks.
Proposition 2 For a given initial output share of public consumption (ωG):
(i) r, y, ωC, ωI, and θ are independent of η; and
(ii) r, y, ωC, and θ are increasing in β and ωI is decreasing in β.
Proof See Appendix A.4.
3.3 Graphical Apparatus
In order to facilitate the discussion of the model, it is summarized graphically by means
of two schedules plotted in Figure 1. The ﬁrst schedule is the Capital Stock Equilibrium
(CSE) curve, which represents all points for which the goods market is in equilibrium with a
constant capital stock ( ˙ ˜ K(t) = 0). The CSE curve is obtained by rewriting the ﬁrst equation
in (16) in steady-state form; it is unambiguously upward sloping in ( ˜ C(t), ˜ K(t)) space, that is,
˜ C(t) = −(δ11/δ12) ˜ K(t) + (1/δ12)γK(t), where δ12 < 0 (which is apparent from Deﬁnition 1)
and δ11 > 0.15 The dynamic forces operating on the economy oﬀ the CSE curve are as follows.
Since δ12 < 0, points above the CSE curve are associated with a falling capital stock over
time because both goods consumption is too high and labor supply (and hence production)
is too low. Consequently, investment is too low to replace the depreciated part of the capital
stock. The opposite is the case for points below the CSE curve.
The MKR curve is the Modiﬁed Keynes-Ramsey rule, which represents the steady-state
aggregate Euler equation augmented for endogenous labour supply and the turnover of gen-
erations ( ˙ ˜ C(t) = 0). The MKR curve is obtained by using the steady-state version of the
15From the information on steady-state shares we derive that ωA = (1 − εL) − ωI. It follows that ηφ(1 −
















Figure 1: Lump-Sum Taxes and Endogenous Labor Supply
second equation of (16), that is, ˜ C(t) = −(δ21/δ22) ˜ K(t)+(1/δ22)γC(t). The slope of the MKR
curve is ambiguous because the sign of both δ21 and δ22 depends on two eﬀects that work in
opposite directions, that is, the generational turnover (GT) eﬀect and the labor supply (LS)
eﬀect. The intuition behind these two eﬀects can best be explained by looking at the two
polar cases.
Labor Supply Eﬀect With Inﬁnite Lives The pure LS eﬀect is isolated by studying the
model with endogenous labor supply and inﬁnitely lived representative agents (RA), that is,
φ > 1 and β = 0. In that case, the MKR curve represents points for which the real interest
rate equals the rate of time preference, r[C,K] = α, so that the slope of MKR depends on
the partial derivatives ∂r/∂C and ∂r/∂K. To provide an intuitive explanation of the partial
derivatives, Figure 2 depicts the situation on the markets for production factors. The demand





˜ r(t) = ηεL˜ L(t) − [1 − η(1 − εL)] ˜ K(t). (21)
In terms of Figure 2(a), KD is downward sloping in view of Assumption 2, and an increase
in employment shifts KD to the right. For a given stock of capital, the real interest rate
clears the rental market for capital. In the inﬁnite horizon model, the long-run supply curve














































Panel (a): Rental Market for Capital
Panel (b): Labor Market
Figure 2: The Factor Markets
13By using (AT1.4) and (AT1.8), the demand for labor (LD) can be written as:
˜ w(t) = (ηεL − 1)˜ L(t) + η(1 − εL) ˜ K(t). (22)
In terms of Figure 2(b), an increase in the stock of capital shifts LD to the right, but the
slope of LD is ambiguous and depends on the strength of the diversity eﬀect. If ηεL S 1, LD
is downward sloping, horizontal or upward sloping. Labor supply, LS, is upward sloping and
shifts to the left if private consumption rises (see (AT1.7)). This is the wealth eﬀect in labor
supply, as private consumption is itself proportional to total wealth. Finally, Assumption 1
ensures that the labor supply curve is steeper (with respect to the wage axis) than the labor
demand curve. The larger θ the steeper the labor supply curve and thus the more elastic
labor supply.
An increase in private consumption (from C0 to C1) shifts the labor supply curve to the
left, say from LS(w,C0) to LS(w,C1) in Figure 2(b), and for a given capital stock, employment
falls from L0 to L1.16 This reduces the marginal product of capital, shifts the demand for
capital to the left, say from KD(r,L0) to KD(r,L1) in Figure 2(a), and causes a fall in the
rate of interest. This explains why ∂r/∂C < 0 and thus δ22 < 0.
An increase in the capital stock (from K0 to K1) has two eﬀects. First, the direct eﬀect
shifts the capital supply curve rightward, which reduces the rental price of capital for a given
level of employment. In terms of Figure 2(a), the direct eﬀect is represented by the shift
from E0 to B. There is also an indirect eﬀect because the increase in the capital stock raises
labor demand, say from LD(w,K0) to LD(w,K1) in Figure 2(b). For a given level of private
consumption, employment expands from L0 to L2, which is represented by the shift from E0
to B. Because of the increase in employment, capital demand increases, say from KD(r,L0)
to KD(r,L2) in Figure 2(a). The indirect eﬀect thus represents the shift from point B to
point C directly above it. For a small value of the intertemporal substitution elasticity of
labor supply (θ close to 0) or a weak diversity eﬀect (η ≈ 1), the labor supply parameter
is small (1 < φ < ¯ φ), which we label moderately elastic labor supply.17 In that case, the
direct eﬀect of the capital stock dominates the employment-induced eﬀect, so that the rate
of interest depends negatively on the capital stock, ∂r/∂K < 0 and δ21 < 0. As a result, the
MKR curve in Figure 1 is downward sloping. Points to the left of the curve are associated
with a low capital stock, a high rate of interest, and a rising consumption proﬁle.
For a high enough value of the labor supply parameter (φ = ¯ φ), however, the rate of
16Conversely, a fall in consumption shifts the labor supply curve from L
S(w,C0) to L
S(w,C2) so that
employment expands. The moves from E0 to C and from C to D in Figure 2(b) represent, respectively, the
wealth eﬀect and the substitution eﬀect in labor supply.
17Depending on the magnitude of φ, three labor supply cases can be distinguished that are all consistent
with saddle point stability: (i) φ = 1 (inelastic); (ii) 1 < φ < ¯ φ ≡ 1/(η(1 − εL)) (moderately elastic); and
(iii) φ > ¯ φ (highly elastic). As labor supply becomes more elastic, the MKR curve rotates counter clockwise.
Saddle point stability prescribes that the CSE curve is steeper than the MKR curve. The second case is drawn
in Figure 1.
14interest does not depend on the capital stock as the two eﬀects exactly cancel. Figure 2(a)
shows that the employment expansion shifts the demand for capital all the way to intersect
supply in point D, implying a horizontal MKR curve. For points above the MKR curve,
private consumption is too high, and both labor supply and the rate of interest are too low
(that is, r(t) < α). As a result, the consumption proﬁle is downward sloping. For an even
higher value of the labor supply parameter (φ > ¯ φ), the employment-induced eﬀect dominates
the direct eﬀect so that capital demand shifts all the way to intersect capital supply at point
E of Figure 2(a). The rate of interest now depends positively on the capital stock, ∂r/∂K > 0
and δ21 > 0. Accordingly, the MKR curve is upward sloping. Points to the left of the MKR
curve are associated with a low rate of interest, and a falling consumption proﬁle.
Generational Turnover Eﬀect With Exogenous Labor Supply The pure GT eﬀect
is isolated by studying the model with exogenous labor supply and ﬁnitely lived agents, for
which φ = 1 and β > 0. In that case, the MKR curve represents points for which the tilt to
the consumption proﬁle of individual households is precisely suﬃcient to compensate for the
turnover of ﬁnancial assets across generations, r(K) − α = β(α + β)K/C, where r now does
not depend on private consumption because labor supply is exogenous. From Figure 2(a) it
is clear that with a ﬁxed labor supply, only the direct eﬀect of a change in K remains so that
∂r/∂K < 0.
The MKR curve is upward sloping because of the turnover of generations. Its slope can
be explained by appealing directly to equation (T1.2) (with εC = 1, A = K and B = 0)
and Figure 3(a). Suppose that the economy is initially on the MKR curve, say at point
E0. Now consider a lower level of private consumption, say at point B. For the same capital
stock ( ˜ K(0) = 0), both points feature the same rate of interest. Accordingly, individual
consumption growth, ˙ C(v,t)/C(v,t) [= r − α], coincides in the two points.
Equation (23) indicates, however, that aggregate consumption growth depends not only
on individual growth but also the proportional diﬀerence between average consumption, C(t),












Since newly born generations start without any ﬁnancial capital, the absolute diﬀerence be-
tween average consumption and consumption of a newly born household depends on the
average capital stock and is thus the same in the two points. Since the level of aggregate
consumption is lower in B, this point features a larger proportional diﬀerence between average
and newly born consumption, thereby decreasing aggregate consumption growth. To restore
a zero growth of aggregate consumption, the capital stock must fall (to point E1), which not
18We use the fact that C(t) = εC(α + β)[A(t) + H(t)] and C(t,t) = εC(α + β)H(t), where
H(t) is human wealth, that is, the after-tax value of the household’s time endowment: H(t) ≡
R ∞




t [r(s) + β]ds
¤
dz.
15only raises individual consumption growth—by increasing the rate of interest—but also low-
ers the drag on aggregate consumption growth due to the turnover of generations. Because
a smaller capital stock narrows the gap between average wealth (that is, the wealth of the
generations that pass away) and wealth of the newly born, the generational turnover eﬀect is
smaller.
For points above (below) the MKR curve, the GT eﬀect is weak (strong), so that the
aggregate consumption proﬁle is rising (falling) over time. In terms of Figure 3(a), steady-
state equilibrium is attained at the intersection of the CSE and MKR curves at point E0.
Given the conﬁguration of arrows, it is clear that this equilibrium is saddle-point stable, and
that the saddle path, SP0, is upward sloping and steeper than the CSE curve.
16Figure 3: Permanent Public Consumption Shocks in the Overlapping Generations Model
Panel (a) Panel (b) Panel (c)




























































74 Lump-Sum Tax Financing of Fiscal Shocks
The base case concerns an unanticipated and permanent impulse (at t = 0) to government
consumption (that is, ˜ G > 0 and ξG = 0), which is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes only ( ˜ B(t) = 0,
for all t ≥ 0, so that ˜ G(t) = ˜ T (t)). We refer to this case as that of ‘pure lump-sum tax
ﬁnancing.’ In terms of (16), the shock terms are γK(t) = yωG ˜ G > 0 and γC(t) = 0 for all
t ≥ 0. Hence, the MKR curve is unaﬀected and the CSE curve shifts down in Figures 1 and
3. Intuitively, increasing government consumption withdraws resources from the economy.
To maintain the same capital stock in equilibrium, private consumption must fall. Before
turning to the results of the most general model, we ﬁrst study the case of exogenous labor
supply.
4.1 Exogenous Labor Supply
In order to focus on the pure GT eﬀect, this section deals with the case of exogenous labor
supply (φ = 1, see (15)). The GT eﬀect ensures that the MKR curve is upward sloping as
shown in Figure 3(a). A permanently higher level of government spending shifts the CSE curve
down. Since the physical capital stock is ﬁxed initially, the adjustment consists of a jump from
E0 to A on the new saddle path, SP1, followed by a gradual reduction of private consumption
and capital toward the new equilibrium at E1. Table 2 summarizes the qualitative results
under exogenous labor supply in Panel (b), which we compare with those for the RA model in
Panel (a).19 It shows impact eﬀects (at t = 0 when the policy is implemented) and long-run
eﬀects (at t → ∞ when the new steady state is reached). The intuition behind the adjustment
to the new steady state is discussed below.
At impact, all existing generations experience a reduction in human wealth—deﬁned as
the present discounted value of the household’s time endowment—because they are faced
with a lump-sum tax increase, a gradual fall in wages, and a gradual increase in the interest
rate, all of which prompts existing generations to cut consumption. Consequently, aggregate
consumption falls at impact, though by less than one for one (−1 < dC(0)/dG < 0), since
human wealth is discounted at the higher ‘risk-of-death’ adjusted discount rate, r + β.
During transition, the decline in the capital stock reduces the importance of the GT
eﬀect, reﬂecting a reduction in the diﬀerence between aggregate and new born consumption
(as discussed in Section 3.3). As a result, aggregate consumption growth and savings fall. In
the new steady state, the capital stock, private consumption, investment, output, and wages
have all fallen and the interest rate has risen. Crowding out of private consumption by public
19Unlike the RA results, the OLG results assume exogenous labor supply to focus on the generational
turnover eﬀect. Furthermore, considering exogenous labor supply in the RA model would not yield any long-
run output eﬀect (see below). We do not discuss in detail the results for the RA model (covering Panel
(a)) given that these are analyzed for the monopolistically competitive case by Devereux, Head, and Lapham
(1996b) and Heijdra (1998) and for the perfectly competitive case (covering Panels (a) and (c)) by Baxter and
King (1993).
18consumption is more than one for one in the long run (dC(∞)/dG < −1). Accordingly, the




(r − α)η(1 − εL)
χωC(r + δ) + (r − α)(χ − ωG)
< 0, (24)
where the denominator is positive due to saddle point stability. By appealing to Proposition
2, it is straightforward to show that the output multiplier is decreasing in the diversity
eﬀect, that is, ∂[dY (∞)/dG]/∂η < 0. Hence, crowding out of private consumption by public
consumption is more severe under monopolistic competition than under perfect competition.
From (24) it can also be clearly seen that under exogenous labor supply in the inﬁnite horizon
RA model—featuring β = 0 so that r = α—a ﬁscal impulse yields full crowding out and thus
cannot aﬀect long-run output. Proposition 3 summarizes the main ﬁndings.
Proposition 3 Consider the OLG model with exogenous labor supply (that is, φ = 1). A
pure lump-sum tax ﬁnanced increase in public consumption gives rise to: (i) unchanged out-
put, but a fall in private consumption in the short run; and (ii) a fall in both output and
private consumption in the long run.
Proof See text and Appendix A.5.
19Table 2: Qualitative Eﬀects of Permanent Fiscal Policy
Policy Measure Time Period1 Representative Agent2 Overlapping Generations3
Y C I L K w r Y C I L K w r
Pure Lump-Sum Tax (a) (b)
Perfect Competition 0 + − + + 0 − + 0 − − 0 0 0 0
∞ + − + + + 0 0 − − − 0 − − +
Monopolistic Competition 0 + − + + 0 ?4 + 0 − − 0 0 0 0
∞ + ?5 + + + + 0 − − − 0 − − +
Public Debt (c) (d)
Perfect Competition 0 + − + + 0 − + 0 − − 0 0 0 0
∞ + − + + + 0 0 − − − 0 − − +
Monopolistic Competition 0 + − + + 0 ?4 + 0 − − 0 0 0 0
∞ + ?5 + + + + 0 − − − 0 − − +
Notes: (1): t = 0, impact eﬀect, t = ∞, long-run eﬀect; (2): Endogenous labor supply; (3): Exogenous labor supply;
(4): Sign of (ηεL − 1) and (5): See Appendix Table 2.
2
04.2 General Model
In the general model, agents have ﬁnite lives and labor supply is endogenous so both the LS
and GT eﬀects are operative. At impact, the general model behaves qualitatively in a similar
fashion to a spending shock as the inﬁnite horizon model—that is, private consumption falls
and output and employment rise—with the exception being the investment response, for
which the result is ambiguous because the LS and GT eﬀects work in opposite directions.
Investment at impact is:
˜ I(0) = (h∗/δ) ˜ K(∞) S 0 ⇔ φ S 1 + γ,
where γ ≡ (r − α)/(r + δ) > 0 summarizes the relative importance of the GT eﬀect and h∗
denotes the adjustment speed to the new steady state. So if the LS eﬀect is dominated by the
GT eﬀect, investment falls at impact despite that labor supply is endogenous. Conversely, if
the LS eﬀect is strong, say φ > 1+γ (Figure 1), investment may rise, particularly if their is a
strong diversity eﬀect.20 Hence, whereas ﬁnite lives help to explain crowding out of capital,
the diversity eﬀect gives rise to ‘crowding in’ of capital provided labor supply is endogenous.
The spending shock is followed by a transition period during which the capital stock
gradually adjusts toward its new equilibrium value. However, in the general model it is
possible for this transition to be absent. Indeed, if φ = 1 + γ, the long-run capital stock is
unaﬀected by the shock so that short-run and long-run eﬀects for all variables are the same.
Intuitively, the GT eﬀect exactly matches the LS eﬀect so that the MKR curve is vertical.
In view of the discussion in Section 4.1, it is not surprising that the sign of the long-run
output eﬀect is ambiguous. Intuitively, a strong LS eﬀect ensures a positive long-run output
eﬀect whereas a strong GT eﬀect works in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, the following
condition can be derived:












which follows from the output expression in Appendix Table 2. Equation (25) says that a
high value for θ implies a strong LS eﬀect whereas a high value for γ implies a strong GT
eﬀect. The most important observation is, however, that the diversity parameter η does not
feature in (25). In view of Proposition 2, θ and r, and thus γ, are independent of η so that
the sign of the output multiplier is unaﬀected by whether or not there exists a diversity eﬀect
in production. Of course, as the results in Sections 4.1 and 4.3 show, the magnitude of the
long-run output multiplier is critically aﬀected by the strength of the diversity eﬀect.
Proposition 4 Consider the OLG model with endogenous labor supply (φ > 1) and let
γ ≡ (r − α)/(r + δ) > 0. A pure lump-sum tax ﬁnanced increase in public consumption
20For a plausibly calibrated version of the model, it can be shown that the LS eﬀect dominates the GT
eﬀect, even if unrealistically high values of the birth rate are allowed. See Section 4.3 for a further discussion.
21has the following features: (i) output rises and private consumption falls at impact; and (ii)
in the long run, output rises if φ is large enough (if φ > 1+γ) and private consumption falls
if 1 < φ < 1 + γ.
Proof See text and Appendix A.5.
How do these results compare to the RA model? Under ﬁnite horizons, taking the case of
a suﬃciently elastic labor supply, private consumption falls by less than in the inﬁnite horizon
framework because households internalize less of the additional tax burden associated with
the ﬁscal impulse. Accordingly, labor supply expands by less and thus the increase in the
capital stock will also be smaller. Steady-state output eﬀects are thus smaller too.
4.3 Numerical Exercises
To illustrate the quantitative signiﬁcance of returns to scale, the intertemporal labor supply
eﬀect, and the birth rate on the size of the output multipliers, this section presents the results
of simulations with a calibrated example of the model.
The parameters that are kept ﬁxed throughout the simulations are the following. The
rate of pure time preference (α) is assumed to be 3 percent. The rate of depreciation (δ) is
set to 7 percent a year and the output share of labor income (εL) is set equal to 0.7 (which
corresponds roughly to the value found for EU countries). Government spending as a share
of GDP (ωG) is 20 percent. In the simulations β, η, and θ are varied. Once these are set, all
other information on output shares can be derived. In the benchmark case, β = 0.05, η = 1.3,
and θ = 2.
Table 3 reports the impact and long-run multipliers for output and private consumption as
well as the adjustment speed of the economy (h∗) for diﬀerent values of θ (across columns) and
diﬀerent values of β (across rows). In line with the analytical results, the output multipliers
are increasing in θ and decreasing in β. Interestingly, the magnitude of θ is much more
important to the size of the output multiplier than β. For example, even for a very high
birth rate, say β = 0.50, a relatively modest value of θ suﬃces to explain a positive long-run
output multiplier. Only for very small values of θ does the GT eﬀect dominate the LS eﬀect,
suggesting that it is diﬃcult to generate large OLG eﬀects in models of this type.21
Table 4 shows the interaction between the birth rate (across columns) and the diversity
eﬀect (across rows). The ﬁrst row corresponds to the perfectly competitive case (η = 1.0). The
results suggest that the diversity eﬀect exerts a much stronger eﬀect on the output multipliers
than the birth rate. Both the impact and the long-run output multipliers are increasing in η.
21This is also supported by the work of R´ ıos-Rull (1996). The business cycle statistics that he ﬁnds for a
calibrated life-cycle economy are roughly in line with those found for standard RBC models as discussed in
Cooley and Prescott (1995).
22Table 3: Output Multipliers, Birth Rates, and
Labor Supply Elasticities
Value of θ
0 0.5 1 2 5
β = 0
dY (0)
dG 0 0.526 0.815 1.149 1.589
dC(0)
dG −1 −0.712 −0.576 −0.440 −0.299
dY (∞)
dG 0 0.721 1.009 1.261 1.482
dC(∞)
dG −1 −0.430 −0.203 −0.004 0.171
h∗ 0.084 0.110 0.129 0.156 0.200
β = 0.01
dY (0)
dG 0 0.520 0.809 1.145 1.586
dC(0)
dG −0.987 −0.708 −0.574 −0.439 −0.299
dY (∞)
dG −0.021 0.706 0.998 1.253 1.479
dC(∞)
dG −1.010 −0.437 −0.207 −0.007 0.170
h∗ 0.086 0.112 0.131 0.157 0.200
β = 0.05
dY (0)
dG 0 0.484 0.769 1.109 1.564
dC(0)
dG −0.916 −0.680 −0.559 −0.433 −0.297
dY (∞)
dG −0.127 0.613 0.920 1.197 1.448
dC(∞)
dG −1.069 −0.479 −0.240 −0.029 0.159
h∗ 0.100 0.126 0.144 0.168 0.208
β = 0.10
dY (0)
dG 0 0.441 0.714 1.052 1.520
dC(0)
dG −0.850 −0.647 −0.539 −0.423 −0.294
dY (∞)
dG −0.223 0.506 0.818 1.109 1.390
dC(∞)
dG −1.138 −0.535 −0.286 −0.064 0.138
h∗ 0.124 0.152 0.170 0.192 0.226
β = 0.50
dY (0)
dG 0 0.342 0.562 0.846 1.270
dC(0)
dG −0.733 −0.577 −0.490 −0.393 −0.280
dY (∞)
dG −0.380 0.291 0.576 0.840 1.105
dC(∞)
dG −1.326 −0.695 −0.432 −0.196 0.024
h∗ 0.347 0.410 0.442 0.470 0.479
23Table 4: Output Multipliers, Diversity Eﬀect, and
Birth Rates
Value of β
0 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.50 1.00
η = 1.0
dY (0)
dG 0.867 0.863 0.830 0.777 0.597 0.554
dC(0)
dG −0.585 −0.583 −0.570 −0.550 −0.489 −0.476
dY (∞)
dG 0.922 0.916 0.871 0.802 0.596 0.553
dC(∞)
dG −0.272 −0.274 −0.288 −0.313 −0.417 −0.450
h∗ 0.164 0.165 0.176 0.199 0.467 0.826
η = 1.1
dY (0)
dG 0.961 0.956 0.922 0.866 0.675 0.629
dC(0)
dG −0.538 −0.536 −0.526 −0.509 −0.459 −0.448
dY (∞)
dG 1.031 1.024 0.976 0.900 0.673 0.625
dC(∞)
dG −0.186 −0.188 −0.205 −0.234 −0.347 −0.381
h∗ 0.161 0.162 0.173 0.197 0.468 0.830
η = 1.3
dY (0)
dG 1.149 1.145 1.109 1.052 0.845 0.793
dC(0)
dG −0.440 −0.439 −0.433 −0.423 −0.393 −0.386
dY (∞)
dG 1.261 1.253 1.197 1.109 0.840 0.783
dC(∞)
dG −0.004 −0.007 −0.029 −0.064 −0.196 0.233
h∗ 0.156 0.157 0.168 0.192 0.470 0.840
η = 1.5
dY (0)
dG 1.137 1.332 1.300 1.244 1.037 0.982
dC(0)
dG −0.338 −0.338 −0.335 −0.331 −0.318 −0.316
dY (∞)
dG 1.507 1.499 1.435 1.336 1.027 0.959
dC(∞)
dG 0.191 0.187 0.162 0.121 −0.026 −0.065
h∗ 0.149 0.151 0.162 0.187 0.472 0.852
24For high values of β or high values of θ or both, the short-run output multiplier exceeds the
long-run output multiplier.
Tables 3-4 demonstrate that the adjustment speed of the economy is increasing in the
birth rate. Hence, an economy populated with ﬁnitely lived agents shows much less out-
put persistence than an economy characterized by inﬁnitely lived agents. The adjustment
speed, however, is decreasing in η, indicating that the diversity eﬀect can help explain output
persistence.
5 Debt Financing of Fiscal Shocks
A well-known result from the traditional literature on the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy is
that output multipliers are larger under debt ﬁnancing than under lump-sum tax ﬁnancing
provided the model is stable (see Blinder and Solow (1973)). Intuitively, the rise in the
debt stock causes a wealth eﬀect in private consumption that helps bring about Blinder and
Solow’s result. Adherents of the Ricardian equivalence theorem have argued, however, that
government debt and lump-sum taxes are equivalent. A key question is whether the classic
Blinder-Solow result upholds in an OLG setting in which Ricardian equivalence fails. We ﬁrst
study permanent ﬁscal shocks and subsequently analyze temporary ﬁscal shocks.
5.1 Bond Path
The notion of debt ﬁnancing is modeled as follows. At impact, government consumption
rises—while keeping constant or cutting initial lump-sum taxes—so that a ﬁscal deﬁcit emerges,
which is ﬁnanced by issuing government bonds during transition. Gradually, lump-sum taxes
start to rise to ﬁnance the redemption of government debt. In the new steady state, the ﬁscal
deﬁcit is closed again. Formally, the path of lump-sum taxes is postulated as follows:
˜ T(t) =
(
˜ G(t) for ξT = 0
−˜ T0 +
£
1 − e−ξTt¤ ˜ T∞ for ξT > 0
, (26)
where ˜ T0 > 0 if there is an initial lump-sum tax cut, ξT is the adjustment speed of lump-sum
taxes, and subscripts to variables are used to denote time-invariant components. Policies
involving bond ﬁnancing are described by ξT > 0 whereas for ξT = 0 there is no bond
ﬁnancing.
In the absence of initial public debt, the government solvency condition (13) can—upon
loglinearization—be written in general terms as L{˜ T(t),r} = L{ ˜ G(t),r}, where L denotes
the Laplace transform operator.22 Government solvency implies that the long-run increase in




Intuitively, L{x,s} represents the present value of x(t) using s = r as the discount rate.













> ˜ T0, for ξT > 0. (27)
Intuitively, in the long run, lump-sum taxes must rise by enough to cover additional govern-
ment spending on goods plus the interest payments on the public debt that is accumulated
during the transition period. Accordingly, future generations face a larger lump-sum tax
burden than present generations.
By combining (18), (27), and (AT1.3), the bond path is obtained:












˜ G + ωG
r
ξT
(1 − e−ξTt)˜ T0, (28)
with ξT > 0 (of course, for ξT = 0, ˜ B (t) ≡ 0 for all t). The exogenous parameters in (28)
are ˜ G, ˜ T0, ξG, and ξT, whereas the implied value ˜ T∞ keeps the government solvent. By only
gradually raising lump-sum taxes, the government allows for a smooth build-up of public debt
from an initial position of zero (B(0) = 0) to a long-run level of B(∞) > 0. More formally,
the long-run change in public debt is given by:











˜ T0 − ˜ G(∞)
¸
. (29)
Provided ξT > 0 the resulting debt process is stable. For a given increase in public spending,
the lower the value for ξT, the slower is the adjustment of lump-sum taxes, and the larger is
the resulting long-run debt stock.
By using (28) in (20) the dynamic system can be written as in (16) with the following
shock terms:
γK(t) ≡ yωG ˜ Ge−ξGt, (30)
γC(t) ≡ (r − α)yωG
"µ











From (31) it appears that under ﬁnite horizons (r > α), Ricardian equivalence fails, so that
government debt has real eﬀects at impact, during transition, and in the long run.23
5.2 Permanent Fiscal Shocks
We consider two types of permanent ﬁscal shocks (ξG = 0) ﬁnanced by public debt (ξT > 0):
(i) moderate ﬁscal policy; and (ii) drastic ﬁscal policy.
23Clearly, the RA model satisﬁes the conditions for Ricardian equivalence. Since r = α it follows from (31)
that γC(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0. Indeed, in Table 2 the results in Panels (a) and (c) are identical. Only the paths
of (individual and aggregate) ﬁnancial assets are aﬀected by the ﬁnancing method employed.
26Moderate Fiscal Policy We consider a bond-ﬁnanced permanent rise in public spending
γK(t) = ˜ G > 0 for all t, while keeping initial lump-sum taxes constant (˜ T0 = 0), so that
γC(∞) > 0 (from (31)). Subsequently, we will discuss the case of exogenous and endogenous
labor supply.
The case of exogenous labor supply can be illustrated by Figure 3(b). At impact, the
CSE curve shifts down from CSE0 to CSE1, but the MKR curve is unaﬀected (γC(0) = 0).
Gradually over time, the MKR curve shifts to the left, say from MKR0 to MKR1 (γC(t) > 0
for t > 0), owing to households accumulating government bonds in their portfolios. The
adjustment is from E0 to A′ at impact followed by a gradual movement (the speed of which is
governed by both h∗ > 0 and ξT > 0) from A′ to E′
1. Under pure lump-sum tax ﬁnancing, the
adjustment is from E0 to A on impact, followed by a gradual transition from A to E1, showing
a larger impact eﬀect and a smaller long-run eﬀect on private consumption than under bond
ﬁnancing.
Compared to the pure lump-sum tax case, the qualitative eﬀects of bond ﬁnancing on all
variables are similar, which is summarized in Panels (b) and (d) of Table 2. The results set
out in Proposition 3 continue to hold. The quantitative eﬀects diﬀer though—bond-ﬁnanced
impact eﬀects are less pronounced and long-run eﬀects are more pronounced than under
lump-sum tax ﬁnancing. Intuitively, the use of bond policy shifts the burden of additional
lump-sum taxes from present to future generations. As a result, the reduction in human
wealth at impact is less severe so that the fall in consumption is also smaller. In the long
run, however, lump-sum taxes and the rate of interest are higher and the capital stock (and
thus the wage) is lower than in the pure lump-sum case. Consequently, long-run crowding out
of private consumption and capital formation is more severe under bond ﬁnancing. In sum,
Blinder and Solow’s result does not hold in an OLG setting with exogenous labor supply. The
intergenerational redistribution of the tax burden under bond ﬁnancing renders the long-run
output multiplier smaller (instead of larger) than under pure lump-sum tax ﬁnancing.
As was argued in Section 4.2, both the GT and LS eﬀects are operative in the general
model, so that the slope of the MKR curve is ambiguous. Two cases—diﬀering in the transi-
tion paths to the new steady state—can be distinguished depending on the relative strengths
of the GT and LS eﬀects. First, if the GT eﬀect is dominant (1 < φ < 1 + γ),24 adjustment
to the new steady state after the spending shock is monotonic. The initial fall in private
consumption is followed by a further fall in consumption ( ˜ C(∞) < ˜ C(0) < 0) and physical
capital gradually declines to its lower steady-state level. This result is similar to that of
Propositions 3 and 4.
Second, if the LS eﬀect dominates the GT eﬀect (φ > 1 + γ), transition in both private
24If the LS eﬀect exactly matches the GT eﬀect (φ = 1 + γ), yielding a vertical MKR curve, there are
transitional dynamics under bond ﬁnancing (against no transitional dynamics under lump-sum tax ﬁnancing).
Public debt crowds out physical capital formation in the long run, causing the MKR curve to shift to the left.
Adjustment to the new steady state is monotonic.




[φ − (1 + γ)] −
(r − α)(φ + ωC − 1)






For the case with φ > 1 + γ, the term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (32) is
positive. It dominates the (positive) second term of (32) provided ξT is not very small. In that
case, investment rises on impact. This is drawn in Figure 3(c). The impact eﬀect is a move
from point E0 to point A which lies below both the CSE1 and MKR0 lines. Consequently, the
capital stock and private consumption start to rise, say from point A to point B, reﬂecting the
increase in investment and rise in household wealth, respectively. Beyond point B the capital
stock starts to fall again. As public debt starts to accumulate during transition, the MKR
shifts down and meets the stable trajectory at point C, after which private consumption falls
along with the capital stock toward the new equilibrium at point E1. The capital stock in
the new equilibrium is smaller than that in the old equilibrium. All this is summarized in
Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Consider the OLG model model with endogenous labor supply (r > α, β > 0,
φ > 1) and let γ ≡ (r − α)/(r + δ). An increase in government consumption ﬁnanced by
public debt has qualitatively similar eﬀects to those of lump-sum tax ﬁnancing if the gener-
ational turnover eﬀect dominates the labor supply eﬀect. The adjustment paths for private
consumption and the capital stock may be non-monotonic if ξT is small and labor supply is
suﬃciently elastic (φ > 1 + γ).
Proof See text and Appendix A.5.
Drastic Fiscal Policy Drastic ﬁscal policy under bond ﬁnancing is represented by γK(t) =
˜ G > 0 for all t and an initial cut in lump-sum taxes (˜ T0 > 0). The position of the MKR curve
in the new steady state is determined by γC(∞) > 0, which follows from (31) for t → ∞.
Here, the case of moderately elastic labor supply is studied.
Figure 3(c) can again be used to show that the CSE curve shifts down from CSE0 to CSE1,
whereas the MKR curve is unaﬀected at time t = 0. The initial fall in private consumption
is smaller than under moderate ﬁscal policy, because the fall in households’ after-tax human
wealth is smaller. Over time, the MKR curve shifts down as households accumulate bonds
in their portfolios. Note that the leftward shift of the MKR curve is larger than under
moderate ﬁscal policy, which is explained by the initial cut in lump-sum taxes. The new
steady state (E2) is thus to the left of the steady state obtained for moderate ﬁscal policy
(E1). Consequently, the steady-state capital stock and the level of private consumption level
are lower.
285.3 Temporary Fiscal Shocks
This section studies temporary ﬁscal shocks with a view to relate our work to the ﬁscal
impulses found in VAR studies. To analyze the dynamic adjustment to a temporary increase
in public spending, numerical examples are used. Various ﬁnancing scenarios are distinguished
to demonstrate the eﬀect of the OLG model structure on the results of ﬁscal shocks.
Approach and Parameters We have ﬁrst analytically derived (A.12) and (A.13), which
are then used in the simulations. The parameter setting of the benchmark model is employed.
Labor supply is thus moderately elastic in all scenarios considered: φ < ¯ φ ≡ 2.56. The
parameter of the path of the public consumption shock, ξG, is set to 0.10 (see (19)), implying
high persistence in the public spending shock (the half-life of the shock is ln2/ξG ≈ 7 years).
In the benchmark case, the parameter of the lump-sum tax path under bond ﬁnancing is set
to ξT = 0.05.
Numerical Results Table 5 shows the numerical results for ﬁve diﬀerent scenarios. Col-
umn (1) presents results for the RA model. Because the increase in public consumption is
temporary, the economy returns to its initial steady state, which is a widely accepted result
in the literature. Obviously, in the new steady state factor prices have not changed. What is
of interest here is the transitional dynamics. In the short run, investment, employment, and
output increase but private consumption falls.25 Wages fall on impact due a larger supply of
labor, but gradually rise once labor demand increases.
Columns (2)-(5) present the OLG cases. Column (2) considers pure lump-sum tax ﬁnanc-
ing (ξT = 0) of a ﬁscal impulse. The impulse responses are virtually identical to those of the
RA model, showing only small quantitative diﬀerences. By comparing Tables 3 and 5, it is
evident that—in line with received wisdom—temporary ﬁscal shocks yield smaller short-run
output multipliers than permanent ﬁscal shocks.
Results are strikingly diﬀerent, once we allow for debt ﬁnancing in the OLG framework
(Columns (3)-(5)). Column (3) assumes ξT = 0.1 and ˜ T0 = 0, implying a bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal
shock that leaves initial lump-sum taxes unchanged. A key result is that a temporary shock
leads to hysteresis in macroeconomic variables. Private consumption not only falls in the
short run but also in the long run. In addition, we ﬁnd negative long-run output multipliers
for a temporary shock, reﬂecting crowding out of private consumption and investment by
public consumption. Intuitively, bond ﬁnancing shifts the burden of taxation forward in time
thereby reducing the net human capital of future generations. Accordingly, they will consume
less. Column (4) sets ξT = 0.05, which shifts more of the burden of lump-sum taxation to
future generations. Not surprisingly, there is a larger negative eﬀect on private consumption
and output in the new steady state.
25However, the crowding out of private consumption by public consumption is smaller than under permanent
ﬁscal policy.
29Table 5: Temporary Fiscal Shocks
RA OLG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dY (0)
dG 0.832 0.825 0.798 0.797 0.766
dY (∞)
dG 0 0 −0.130 −0.164 −0.424
dC(0)
dG −0.318 −0.322 −0.311 −0.311 −0.299
dC(∞)
dG 0 0 −0.069 −0.087 −0.224
dI(0)
dG 0.150 0.147 0.109 0.108 0.064
dI(∞)
dG 0 0 −0.061 −0.078 −0.200
˜ L(0)
˜ G 0.183 0.181 0.175 0.175 0.168
˜ L(∞)
˜ G 0 0 −0.002 −0.003 −0.007
˜ K(0)
˜ G 0 0 0 0 0
˜ K(∞)
˜ G 0 0 −0.062 −0.078 −0.201
˜ w(0)
˜ G −0.017 −0.016 −0.016 −0.016 −0.015
˜ w(∞)
˜ G 0 0 −0.024 −0.030 −0.078
dr(0)
˜ G 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
dr(∞)
˜ G 0 0 0.004 0.005 0.012
Notes: (1): Representative agent; (2)-(5): overlapping generations;
(2): no debt ﬁnancing; (3)-(5): with debt ﬁnancing;
(3)-(4): moderate ﬁscal policy; and (5): drastic ﬁscal policy.
30Column (5) studies a public spending shock combined with a cut in initial lump-sum taxes
(˜ T0 = 0.1). The short-run fall in private consumption is smaller than in Column (4) because
households enjoy additional tax relief at impact. However, future generations pay the price
of debt redemption, reducing their long-run consumption by more than under scenarios (3)
and (4). In addition, the long-run output multiplier is (in absolute terms) the largest of all
scenarios.
Links to VAR Evidence In line with VAR studies, we ﬁnd that temporary ﬁscal shocks
can have long-lasting eﬀects on macroeconomic variables. The OLG model structure together
with bond ﬁnancing gives rise to non-zero steady-state eﬀects, providing a shock propagation
mechanism that has not been analyzed in the literature yet.
VAR studies ﬁnd that in the short run a positive ﬁscal shock raises both private consump-
tion and output. Our model ﬁnds a negative correlation between private consumption and
output in the initial phase after the shock. However, the scenario of drastic ﬁscal policy (Col-
umn (5)) produces a positive correlation between Y (t) and C(t) in the medium run (already
after 10 time periods) and long run. To also bring the initial phase of the transition path in
line with VAR evidence, new elements should be introduced into the model, which is beyond
the scope of this paper.
6 Conclusions
The micro-founded dynamic macroeconomic framework explored here proves rich in further
understanding the output eﬀects of ﬁscal policy under various ﬁnancing scenarios and settings
of the structural parameters. The richness of the results naturally reﬂects the comprehensive
nature of our model. Support is found for the claim that under certain conditions the activist
(New)Keynesian view on ﬁscal policy may be too optimistic about the potency of ﬁscal policy
in boosting output. In more detail, the results are as follows.
Take ﬁrst the case of lump-sum tax ﬁnancing of an unanticipated and permanent spending
impulse. The eﬀect of introducing overlapping generations of mortal agents is to lower the
size of long-run output multipliers, and even possibly to change their sign—that is, they can
now become negative rather than positive. Under lump-sum tax ﬁnancing, public spending
multipliers may turn negative if the generational turnover eﬀect is suﬃciently strong to dom-
inate the intertemporal substitution eﬀect in labor supply. For exogenous labor supply, this
condition is evidently satisﬁed. However, for plausible parameter values, the generational
turnover eﬀect is unlikely to dominate the labor supply eﬀect. In this context, short-run
output multipliers are smaller than long-run multipliers.
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition, featuring zero excess proﬁts due to instanta-
neous entry or exit of ﬁrms, increases the absolute value of balanced-budget output multipli-
ers. Under lump-sum taxation and exogenous labor supply, Ethier-style productivity eﬀects
31help to explain larger crowding out eﬀects of public spending—and consequently more neg-
ative output multipliers—than under perfect competition. Under lump-sum taxation and
suﬃciently elastic labor supply, however, large crowding in eﬀects may result, giving rise to
positive long-run multipliers.
Bond ﬁnancing of permanent ﬁscal shocks has real eﬀects in an overlapping generations
setting because Ricardian equivalence fails. Under bond ﬁnancing of a rise in public con-
sumption, long-run output multipliers are smaller than under lump-sum tax ﬁnancing. Debt
ﬁnancing may give rise to non-monotonic adjustment paths if labor supply is moderately
elastic and the speed of adjustment of lump-sum taxes is not too high. A bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal
impulse combined with an initial cut in lump-sum taxes magniﬁes the reduction in long-run
output multipliers as compared to multipliers under lump-sum tax ﬁnancing.
A lump-sum tax ﬁnanced temporary rise in public consumption does not have any long-
run eﬀects on macroeconomic variables, in line with results in an inﬁnitely lived household
framework. Bond ﬁnancing, however, gives rise to strikingly diﬀerent results; temporary
ﬁscal shocks have permanent eﬀects on output and other macroeconomic variables. Negative
long-run output multipliers are obtained, caused by a large crowding out eﬀect of private
investment by public consumption than under permanent shocks. Our model is partially able
to produce evidence in line with that of VAR studies. Bond ﬁnancing combined with a cut
in lump-sum taxes produces a positive correlation between output and private consumption
in the medium and long run.
There are of course many aspects of ﬁscal policy that have not been addressed here, such
as the eﬀects of anticipated ﬁscal shocks, other forms of ﬁnancing the ﬁscal impulse (for
example, labor taxation), and the optimal provision of public goods. Furthermore, the model
could easily be turned into a full-ﬂedged RBC model by including stochastic public spending
shocks and menu-cost driven price stickiness. We leave these extensions for further research.
32Appendix: Model Solution
In this appendix we show how the main results of Sections 3-5 were derived.
A.1 Log-linearization
We log-linearize the model of Table 1 around an initial steady state, using the follow-
ing notational conventions. A tilde (˜) denotes a relative change, for example, ˜ x(t) ≡
dx(t)/x, for most of the variables, except for: (i) time derivatives: ˙ ˜ x(t) ≡ d˙ x(t)/x for
x ∈ {K,L,N,Y,C,I,w,r,T,G}, and ˙ ˜ B(t) ≡ rd ˙ B(t)/Y ; and (ii) ﬁnancial assets (that is,
A(t), B(t)), which are scaled by steady-state output and multiplied by r, for example,
˜ B(t) ≡ rdB(t)/Y . The results of the log-linearization are reported in Appendix Table 1.
The model can be reduced to a two-dimensional system of ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equations
in the capital stock, ˜ K(t), and private consumption, ˜ C(t). Conditional on the state variables
and the policy shocks, the static part of the log-linearized model, consisting of equations
(AT1.4)-(AT1.8) in Appendix Table 1, can be used to derive the following ‘quasi-reduced
form’ expressions:
˜ Y (t) = ηφ(1 − εL) ˜ K(t) − (φ − 1) ˜ C(t), (A.1)
ωI ˜ I(t) = ˜ Y (t) − ωC ˜ C(t) − ωG ˜ G(t), (A.2)
ηεL˜ L(t) = ˜ Y (t) − η(1 − εL) ˜ K(t), (A.3)
ηεL ˜ w(t) = (ηεL − 1)˜ Y (t) + η(1 − εL) ˜ K(t). (A.4)
A.2 Solution Method
Equations (A.1)-(A.2) and (AT1.5) can be combined with (AT1.1)-(AT1.2) to derive the
dynamic system given in (16) in the main text. Taking the Laplace transform of (16) and









˜ C(0) − L{γC,s}
#
, (A.5)
where Λ(s) ≡ sI−∆, where I is the identity matrix. The characteristic roots of ∆ are denoted












where adjΛ(λ2) is the adjoint matrix of Λ(λ2), which has rank 1. Using the ﬁrst row of (A.6),
we get:






26The details of the solution method are set out in an accessible form in Heijdra and Van der Ploeg (2002,
pp. 684-690).




























K are deﬁned as:
γ0
C ≡















K ≡ yωG ˜ G.


















The root inequality λ2 > ¯ λ (see Section A.3) implies that λ2 > δ22.



















whereas the second row of (A.5) gives rise the transition path for ˜ C(t):
















where A(λ1,t) ≡ 1 − e−λ1t is an adjustment term. Note that T(ξi,λ1,t) is a non-negative,




α1−α2 for α1  = α2
te−α1t for α1 = α2,
where α1 ≥ 0 and α2 ≥ 0 are parameters.
A.3 Stability
Saddle-point stability holds provided the determinant of ∆ is negative:
|∆| = −(r + δ)y [ωG(φ − 1) + ωCφχ + γ[φχ − ωG]], (A.14)
34where χ ≡ 1−η(1−εL) and γ ≡ (r − α)/(r + δ). Proposition 1(i) is proved as follows. With
ﬁnite lives, β > 0, r > α, so that γ > 0 and it follows from (A.14) that φχ ≥ ωG is suﬃcient
for saddle-point stability. With inﬁnite horizons, β = 0, r = α, and γ = 0. If ωG(φ − 1) = 0
then stability holds iﬀ χ > 0. If ωG(φ − 1) > 0 then χ > 0 is suﬃcient but not necessary for
stability.
Proposition 1(ii) is proved as follows. Since |∆| = −λ1λ2 < 0, ∆ has distinct roots
−λ1 ≡ −h∗ < 0 and λ2 ≡ r∗ > 0. To prove the inequality for the unstable root we must show
that Λ(¯ λ) < 0, where ¯ λ ≡ r − α + ωC(r + δ) > 0. After some manipulations we get:
Λ(¯ λ) = −y(φ + ωC − 1)
¡
ωG(r + δ) + ¯ λ[1 − (1 − εL)]
¢
< 0,
which proves Proposition 1(ii). Proposition 1(iii) follows from the expressions for ˜ I (0) and
˜ K (∞) in Appendix Table 2 and noting that ˜ G + ˜ T0 = 0 for the case under consideration.
A.4 Changing β and η
The proof of Proposition 2 is as follows. By using (T1.1)-(T1.2) in steady state and (T1.4)-
(T1.7), we get:
(r − α)ωC = βεC(α + β)κ, (A.15)
1 − ωG = ωC + δκ, (A.16)





where κ ≡ K/Y ≡ 1/y. By substituting (A.16) into (A.15) and noting (A.17), we get a
two-equation system in r and κ only:
r − α =
βεC(α + β)κ
1 − ωG − δκ
, (A.19)




Clearly, ωC > 0 so we have from (A.15) and (A.16) that 0 < κ < (1 − ωG)/δ. Accordingly,
equation (A.19) gives rise to an upward sloping curve in the (r,κ) space, whilst (A.20) is
downward sloping. There is a unique equilibrium, κ∗, which is the positive root of the
quadratic equation:
[δ(α + δ) − βεC(α + β)]κ2−[δ(1 − εL) + (α + δ)(1 − ωG)]κ+(1−εL)(1−ωG) = 0. (A.21)
Part (i) of Proposition 2 can be proved as follows. Since (A.21) does not contain η, κ∗ and
thus (via (A.17)) r do not depend on η. From this, (A.16), and (A.18), it follows that ωC
and θ are not aﬀected either. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 follows from (A.19). An increase in
β, rotates (A.19) counterclockwise, increases r and decreases κ. Hence, ωC and θ increase
whilst ωI decreases.
35A.5 Comparative Dynamics of Permanent Fiscal Shocks
By using (17) and (A.10) in (A.12) and (A.13) and noting that ξG = 0, we obtain the impact,
transition, and long-run eﬀects of a permanent rise in public consumption on the capital stock
and private consumption. By also using (A.1)-(A.4) and (AT1.9) the results for the remaining
variables are obtained.
The results in Section 4 of the main text are obtained by setting γ0
C = γ1
C = 0 in (A.11),
(A.12), and (A.13), and choosing the appropriate parameter settings in Appendix Table 2:
exogenous labor supply (φ = 1) or endogenous labor supply (φ > 1). The results in Section
5.2 are derived by setting 0 < ξT ≪ ∞ and using the values for γ0
C and γ1
C from (A.10).
36Appendix Table 1: The Log-linearized Model
˙ ˜ K(t) = yωI
h
˜ I(t) − ˜ K(t)
i
(AT1.1)
˙ ˜ C(t) = r˜ r(t) + (r − α)
h
˜ C(t) − ˜ K(t) − (1/ωA) ˜ B(t)
i
(AT1.2)
˙ ˜ B(t) = r
h
˜ B(t) + ωG ˜ G(t) − ωT ˜ T(t)
i
(AT1.3)
˜ L(t) = ˜ Y (t) − ˜ w(t) (AT1.4)






˜ Y (t) = ωC ˜ C(t) + ωI ˜ I(t) + ωG ˜ G(t) (AT1.6)
˜ L(t) = θ
h
˜ w(t) − ˜ C(t)
i
(AT1.7)
˜ Y (t) = η ˜ N(t) = η
h














εL ≡ wL/Y : Share of before-tax wage income in real output; ωA ≡ rK/Y : Share of income from
ﬁnancial assets in real output; ωG ≡ G/Y : Share of government spending in real output; ωC ≡ C/Y :
Share of private consumption in real output; ωI ≡ I/Y : Share of investment spending in real output;
θ ≡ (1 − L)/L: Ratio of leisure to labor; ωT ≡ T/Y : Share of lump-sum taxes in real output; η:
Diversity eﬀect; and y ≡ Y/K: Initial output-capital ratio.
37Appendix Table 2: Pure Lump-Sum Tax Financing and Debt Financing
of a Permanent Fiscal Shock
˜ C(0) = −
µ
λ2 − (r − α) + (φ − 1)(r + δ)
λ2(φ + ωC − 1)
¶









(φ − 1)(r + δ) − (r − α)
λ2ωI
¶
ωG ˜ G −




˜ G + ˜ T0
i
˜ K(∞) = ˜ I(∞) =
µ
(φ − 1)(r + δ) − (r − α)
λ1λ2
¶
yωG ˜ G −




˜ G + ˜ T0
i
˜ C(∞) = −
µ
(r − α) + [1 − ηφ(1 − εL)](r + δ)
λ1λ2
¶
yωG ˜ G −




˜ G + ˜ T0
i
˜ Y (∞) =
µ









˜ G + ˜ T0
i
˜ L(∞) =
(φ − 1)χy [r − α + r + δ]
ηεLλ1λ2
yωG ˜ G −






























ωG ˜ G −




˜ G + ˜ T0
i
Notes:
Moderate ﬁscal policy: ˜ G > 0, ˜ T0 = 0; Drastic ﬁscal policy: ˜ G > 0, ˜ T0 > 0; The case of pure lump-sum
ﬁnancing is obtained by setting ˜ T0 = − ˜ G. Note further that χ ≡ 1 − η(1 − εL) > 0; −λ1 < 0 and
λ2 > 0 are the characteristic roots of |∆| deﬁned in (17).
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